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Slovakia began to implement pension
reform in 2004. The main drive behind
this reform was widespread
dissatisfaction with the standard of
living of pensioners. The state Pension
Fund had been in deficit since 1997,
causing a steady decline in real
pensions. By 2003, the average old&age
pension was around 45% of the average
wage in the economy, compared to 54%
in 1991. The difference between the
lowest and the highest pensions was
minimal. The system was good only for
low&income workers and those who
worked in the shadow economy and paid
minimal contributions. This trend was
further stimulated by globalization
processes that enabled high earners to
avoid contributing to the system
altogether. Soaring unemployment in the
late 1990’s, together with an expected
population crisis, emphasized the need
for reform.
Accepting World Bank recommendations
and learning from similar reforms in
Hungary and Poland, the new Slovak
government decided to build a pension
system based on three tiers and a safety
net for people with overly low pensions.
The old PAYG (pay&as&you&go) system
was split into mandatory social
insurance (1st tier) and mandatory
savings (2nd tier), complemented by a
smaller system of voluntary savings 
(3rd tier). The PAYG system was clearly
separated and reduced to simply
guaranteeing a subsistence minimum
financed by taxes.
What reforms to the PAYG system
brought
The reform of the 1st tier of the pension
system brought four major innovations:
• Gradual extensions of statutory
retirement age from an average 
55 years for women and 60 years for
men to 62 years for both. 
• A new pension formula. Higher
pension are given to those who earned
more and paid higher contributions
during their working years. This new
formula should increase incentives to
pay contributions and eliminate
evasion. Since such a system contains
a certain risk for people with lower
pensions, the assumption is that they
will be supported directly from the
State Budget.
• New indexation of awarded
pensions. The “Swiss method”
provides for an automatic yearly
indexing of pensions based on the
weighted average of the CPI
(inflation) and average nominal wage
growth throughout the economy. 
The coefficients are 0.5 for both
parameters. In general, changes in
indexation lessen political influence
on the calculation of pensions and
bind them to the development of
economic indicators instead.
• Early and late retirement. The
reformed PAYG system allows for both
early and late retirement. Each month
of earlier retirement reduces a pension
by 0.5% and each month of later
retirement raises it by 0.5%.
Predictable drawbacks to reform
Although the new PAYG strengthens
incentives, it does not respond
automatically to change in employment.
These have crucial impact on collected
contributions and represent key limiting
factors for the amount of a pension. 
Yet neither the pension calculation
formula nor the indexation rules reflect
such changes and the system continues
to make promises it cannot guarantee.
Based on population trends, problems
could surface as soon as 2015. This
would then require another reform of
the PAYG system involving several
options. Among them are further
extending retirement age, increasing
contributions, changing the pension
formula and/or changing indexation 
(for example, to include only inflation,
which is expected to be lower than wage
growth).
The second tier: Mandatory
contributions 
The new mandatory 2nd tier kicked in on
1 January 2005. All citizens under 
52 years of age are allowed to choose 
to enter the funded tier until June 2006,
while young people first entering the
labor market are obliged to go into this
tier. Their assets will be managed by
private pension funds competing on the
market and supervised by an
independent Fiscal Supervision
Pension reform in Slovakia involved appealing to workers to contribute 
more to the pension system by tying the size of the eventual pension benefit
to the level of contributions. The payasyougo pension system, which
guarantees a minimum living standard, was combined with a mandatory
contribution system that invests employee deductions in the stock market
through private pension funds. The biggest obstacle to this kind of reform,
however, is the admittedly large costs to the state during the transition
period. These generally have to be covered from other sources and this can
put a brake on reforms
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Three kinds of pension 
systems
There are three ways of providing old&
age security in the world: through
taxes, through saving money (funded
schemes), or through insurance
(nonfunded, often in the form of PAYG
schemes). In the funded scheme,
workers set aside a part of their salaries
and accumulate these savings in order
to use them after retirement. Both
other forms, taxes and insurance
schemes, are based on an
intergenerational exchange in which
current workers pay out current
pensioners.
Authority. Each pension company will
manage three funds with different
investment limits and different risk &
return relationships (see TABLE 1). Money
paid to the 2nd tier will be the private,
hereditary ownership of depositors. The
interest earned on these funds will not
be taxed.
Equity is too volatile to provide a stable
income in retirement years, although it
can be a valuable component of an
investment portfolio during the
accumulation phase. Bonds provide
more stable income, at the cost of lower
returns. For this reason, clients of
pension funds invest initially in equity,
to gain the advantage of a large, though
volatile return, and then shift gradually
to bonds as the date of retirement
approaches. In order to allow for this
kind of investment strategy, Slovak
reformers require three different funds.
Each depositor is allowed to hold assets
only in one fund at a time. At 15 years
before retirement, the individual can no
longer hold assets in the growth fund
and 7 years before retirement they have
to completely shift assets to the
conservative fund.
The state directly guarantees neither the
specific performance of pension funds,
nor the principal value of paid
contributions. Indirectly, the law
imposes strict investment limits on
private pension funds and regulates
them strictly while requiring some
minimum performance relative to their
competitors. Moreover, the state
guarantees 100% of the granted pension
in case of fraud or malfeasance.
The high cost of transition can
inhibit reforms
The introduction of the 2nd tier means
high transition costs for the first few
decades. These are a consequence of
diverting contributions from the PAYG
system into this tier: the state receives
less money but still has to pay out the
same pensions. Transition costs depend
positively on the contribution rate in the
funded tier and on the number of people
switching. In Slovakia, these costs are
expected to be around 1% of GDP yearly. 
The costs of the transition period can be
covered by:
• Budget;
• borrowings; 
• raising the retirement age; or
• privatization revenues. 
PAYG reserves and privatization revenues
are expected to cover all Slovak
transition costs until 2011. However, a
lack of funding can appear earlier where
there is massive switching that tends to
be accompanied by higher outlays during
the transition period. In the long run,
even after extending retirement age to
65 years for both genders, there will
likely be a gap in the PAYG financial
balance after 2030. However, after 2054,
the PAYG system will turn into a surplus,
with the majority of pensioners taking a
combined pension from the funded and
PAYG tiers. 
Authors: Eugen Jurzyca, Peter Golias,
INEKO–Institute for Economic and Social
Reforms (Slovakia). This analysis has been
provided in an abridged form. 
For the entire text, visit the ICPS site at:
http://www.icps.com.ua/doc/
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Risk & Return
equities bonds
Growth fund up to 80% no limit high
Balanced fund up to 50% at least 50% medium
Conservative fund 0% 100% low
Portfolio
Table 1. Private pension funds Attention journalists!
In order to improve the quality of
economic policy debate in Ukraine, a
joint project of ICPS has prepared five
analytical briefs:
• Business Environment Reforms in
Central Europe; 
• Pension Reform in Slovakia;
• Social Security and Poverty
Reduction Reforms in Slovakia and 
in the Rest of the Central Europe;
• Health Care Reforms in Central and
Eastern Europe;
• Tax Reforms in the Visegrad
Countries and Their Relevance to the
Ukraine Situation.
They include recommendations for
Ukraine. All five can be downloaded at
http://www.icps.kiev.ua/eng/
project.html?pid=67.
Prepared under the auspices of a joint
project between ICPS and the Institute
of Economic and Social Reform (INEKO)
in Bratislava, the authors are leading
researchers and politicians from Poland,
Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech
Republic. They are prepared to comment
to the press on the experience of
economic reform in their countries, to
provide advice on reforms in Ukraine,
and to respond to general questions
about the economies of Slovakia and
other Central European countries who
joined the EU last year. If you have any
questions on this, you can contact
Yevhen Shulha at yshulha@icps.kiev.ua
or directly e&mail any of the authors:
• Healthcare: Lajos Bokros
(Bokrosl@ceu.hu), former Finance
Minister of Hungary
• Poverty Alleviation: Miroslav Beblavy
(Beblavy@employment.gov.sk), State
Secretary, Ministry of Labor, Social
Affairs and Family of Slovakia
• Pension Reform: Eugen Jurzyca
(jurzyca@ineko.sk), Director,
Institute of Economic and Social
Reform (INEKO), Slovakia
• Tax Reform: Maciej Grabowski
(maciej.grabowski@ibngr.edu.pl),
Vice President, Institute of Market
Economy Research, Poland
• Business Environment: Jan Mladek
(VELKY.MEDVED@seznam.cz), Deputy,
Czech Parliament
The second tier: 
highly popular
The number of people switching into
the 2nd tier exceeded expectations in
both Hungary and Poland. The reason
was widespread distrust in the state
pension system and the willingness of
workers to save into a personal account.
This factor makes the introduction of
the 2nd tier easier. Since having a large
number of people switching raises
transition costs, it may be necessary to
consider regulating the switching
process.
Source: INEKO, based on the Slovak Law on Old&Age Pension Savings
